Opinion: The lab leak conversation shows it’s time to rethink our biosecurity infrastructure, not just policies
The Covid pandemic exacerbated fear and panic regarding the potential for a future bioterrorism agent. As the lab leak theory continues to cause debate, politicians want to be able to tell their constituents that they are solving the problem by adding more oversight to biological research. But if all they are doing is adding more burden, bureaucracy, and box-checking, is it really making anyone more secure?
For half a century, efforts to build a governance system around the security of biology have largely focused on the development and use of biological weapons, starting with the Biological Weapons Convention, which opened for signatories in 1972 and went into force in 1975. It wasn’t until the early 2000s that the research side of biology started getting more attention from the security community, with experts creating methods to determine what security issues we need to worry about, and what we should do about them. After 9/11 and the anthrax mailings, the federal government placed heavy restrictions on research with agents that were deemed to be biological weapons of mass destruction — referred to as select agents. Then, from 2007, there was new attention paid to dual use research, or experiments that could both benefit and harm society, agriculture, or the environment.
